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Abstract
We study a model of “information-based entrenchment” in which the CEO has pri-
vate information that the board needs to make an eﬃcient replacement decision.
Eliciting the CEO’s private information is costly, as it implies that the board must
pay the CEO both higher severance pay and higher on-the-job pay. While higher
CEO pay is associated with higher turnover in our model, there is too little turnover
in equilibrium. Our model makes novel empirical predictions relating CEO turnover,
severance pay, and on-the-job pay to ﬁrm-level attributes such as size, corporate gov-
ernance, and the quality of the ﬁrm’s accounting system.
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tions. This is a substantially revised version of an earlier draft entitled “Keeping the Board in the Dark:
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The notion that top management is entrenched, leading to ineﬃcient turnover at the top of
the ﬁrm, is pervasive among both academics and practitioners.1 Our model incorporates
CEO entrenchment into a joint theory of CEO turnover and compensation. Taking CEO
entrenchment into account when deriving hypotheses about CEO turnover is important,
as it naturally creates a wedge between the ﬁrm’s eﬃcient replacement decision and the
actually observed level of turnover. Also, the ﬁrm will optimally design the CEO’s compen-
sation to minimize distortions arising from entrenchment, thereby aﬀecting the likelihood
of future turnover.
Our model is one of endogenous entrenchment. Starting from a simple problem of
moral hazard, we ﬁrst show that the on-the-job pay that must be oﬀered to the CEO to
keep him from shirking biases him towards continuing with the ﬁrm even if his “match
value” is lower than that of a potential replacement CEO. What keeps the board from
implementing an eﬃcient replacement policy is that the CEO has better, albeit private,
information about the ﬁrm value under his continued leadership.2 Inducing eﬃcient CEO
turnover is thus costly, as it requires to elicit the CEO’s private information by granting
him informational rents.
The optimal way to reduce CEO entrenchment, and thus to induce more eﬃcient
turnover, is to increase both the CEO’s on-the-job pay and his severance pay. The need
for higher severance pay is intuitive. After all, the CEO must ﬁnd it attractive to leave
the ﬁrm when the match value under a potential replacement CEO is higher. The need for
higher on-the-job pay follows because otherwise the higher severance pay would undermine
the CEO’s incentives to work hard. That the CEO’s on-the-job pay must increase works,
however, against reducing CEO entrenchment: A CEO who expects higher on-the-job
pay has more to gain from clinging to his job. A key insight of our analysis is that,
through the careful optimal design of the CEO’s compensation package in the form of a
combination of severance pay and high-powered incentive pay, it can be ensured that the
joint increase in severance pay and on-the-job pay has indeed the desired eﬀect of reducing
1See Sonnenfeld (1991) and Shleifer and Vishny (1989).
2The notion that the CEO has information that the board needs for an eﬃcient replacement policy is
not new. For instance, Jensen (1993, p. 864) notes that “the CEO most always determines the agenda
and the information given to the board. This limitation on information hinders the ability of even highly
talented board members to contribute eﬀectively to the monitoring and evaluation of the CEO.”
1CEO entrenchment and thus inducing higher turnover.3
Due to the simplicity of the CEO’s moral hazard problem in our model, high-powered
incentive pay becomes optimal not for the purpose of inducing more eﬀort, but because it
accomplishes a given level of CEO turnover at least cost. Absent any further restrictions,
the optimal on-the-job pay scheme is a high-powered (and discontinuous) bonus scheme.
When we impose additional restrictions stemming from a cash-ﬂow falsiﬁcation problem
à la Lacker and Weinberg (1989), we ﬁnd that a continuous and piecewise linear “option-
like” contract becomes optimal. The “steeper” the ﬁrm can make this contract, the lower
are the (marginal) costs of reducing CEO entrenchment. More CEO entrenchment, and
thus less turnover, would, however, result if the board faced a binding cap on the amount
of severance pay it can pay, e.g., because of political pressure or “public outcry” (see
Bebchuk and Fried 2004).
On the other hand, tying the board’s hands by not allowing it to “top up” the CEO’s
severance pay ex post (“golden handshakes”) beneﬁts the ﬁrm. This is due to a commit-
ment problem that the board, which is assumed to act in the ﬁrm’s interest, faces when
it must decide whether to replace the CEO. At that point, all that matters for the ﬁrm
is to reduce CEO entrenchment. In contrast, the ﬁrm is ex ante additionally constrained
by the need to keep the CEO from shirking, which makes the use of severance pay more
costly as it must be accompanied by a simultaneous increase in on-the-job pay. In our
model, the board’s inability to commit not to “top up” the CEO’s severance pay ex post
would undermine his ex-ante incentives to work hard.
Our model gives rise to several comparative statics results relating CEO turnover, sev-
erance pay, and on-the job pay to ﬁrm-level characteristics. The board wants to ensure
that the CEO becomes less entrenched, implying higher turnover, if entrenchment entails
a larger reduction in ﬁrm value, as is likely the case for larger ﬁrms. Likewise, the board
will oﬀer higher severance pay and induce more subsequent turnover if it becomes less
likely ex ante that the present CEO will also remain the best possible ﬁti nt h ef u t u r e .
Importantly, in this case the CEO’s higher pay does not constitute compensation for the
higher probability that he may be replaced. Higher pay provides him with additional infor-
mational rents that are necessary to soften his entrenchment. Instead, if better corporate
3That severance pay and on-the-job pay must move in the same direction distinguishes our argument
from Bebchuk and Fried (2004), where severance pay is a substitute form of “stealth” compensation for
more visible incentive pay.
2governance makes it harder for the CEO to shirk, then this results in lower pay, both in
terms of severance pay and on-the-job pay, as well as higher turnover.
In a variation of our basic model, we endow not the CEO but rather the board with
better information about the match value. Following recent contributions that stress the
complementary role of boards (e.g., Adams and Ferreira 2007), we wish to capture the
notion that the board may have valuable (albeit private) information that aﬀects how
successful the CEO will be at the ﬁr m . E v e nt h o u g ht h ei n f o r m a t i o nn o wr e s i d e sw i t h
the board, the equilibrium level of CEO turnover is again ineﬃcient, albeit now it is
ineﬃciently high. In contrast to the case of a “weak board”, which has an informational
disadvantage vis-à-vis the CEO, with a “strong board” we ﬁnd that CEO turnover and
pay may now be negatively correlated.
Severance pay plays a central role in our model. Lambert and Larcker (1985) and
Harris (1990) are two early models in which severance pay (or golden parachutes) pro-
vides managers with insurance against the loss of their jobs. More recently, Almazan and
Suarez (2003) consider the role of severance pay for renegotiations between the CEO and
the board. While CEO replacement is always eﬃcient in their model due to symmetric
information between the CEO and the board, severance pay can provide stronger ex-ante
incentives for the CEO than incentive pay. Our model of “information-based entrench-
ment” is also related to Eisfeldt and Rampini (2008), where managers who are privately
informed about the productivity of assets under their control must be rewarded with a
bonus to relinquish control of low-productivity assets.
More generally, the tension between truthtelling at the interim stage and the provision
of ex-ante eﬀort incentives has been previously analyzed in Levitt and Snyder (1997). The
authors consider a model that is very similar to ours in that the agent must ﬁrst exert
eﬀort, then he receives private information, and then the principal must decide whether
to continue the project. In their model, the agent must be rewarded for giving an “early
warning” when his information is unfavorable. Apart from having a diﬀerent focus, what
is novel in our model is the question of optimal contract design with a continuum of
outcomes, leading to new insights regarding the optimality of non-linear compensation
schemes. Moreover, we consider extensions in which the agent can falsify the outcome
and in which the principal (here: the board) is better informed than the agent. Also, our
model contains several novel comparative statics results.
3In an extension of our model, we consider a simple variant of the costly state falsiﬁcation
model by Lacker and Weinberg (1989). While our falsiﬁcation problem is a special case of
theirs, our argument why in a costly state falsiﬁcation setting (piecewise) linear schemes
may be optimal is new and complementary to their argument, which is based on risk
sharing. In our model, piecewise linear schemes are optimal because, next to ensuring that
no falsiﬁcation occurs in equilibrium, they shift as much as possible of the CEO’s pay into
high cash-ﬂow states, allowing the ﬁrm to implement a given level of CEO turnover with
minimal informational rents.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section
3 characterizes the optimal contract implementing a given level of CEO turnover at least
cost. Section 4 shows that under the optimal contract, CEO turnover, on-the-job pay, and
severance pay are all positively related, while Section 5 makes use of this equilibrium rela-
tionship to provide further comparative statics results. Section 6 considers renegotiations
(“golden handshakes”). In Section 7, we depart from our basic model by assuming that
the (“strong”) board, not the CEO, has private information. Section 8 concludes. All
proofs are in the Appendix.
2M o d e l
Information-Based Entrenchment
In t =0 , the board hires a CEO to run the ﬁrm. While the CEO is the best available
candidate at the time, there is uncertainty as to whether he is a good match for the ﬁrm.
In t =1 , the CEO privately observes a signal indicating the quality of the match.4 The
board, on the other hand, does not observe this signal. Hence, the CEO can always avoid
replacement by simply withholding unfavorable information from the board. The ﬁrm’s
cash ﬂow is realized in t =2 . E v e r y b o d yi sr i s kn e u t r a l .
The CEO’s ability to avoid replacement by withholding unfavorable information is an
admittedly parsimonious way to model CEO entrenchment. One could think of a richer
strategy space, e.g., one in which the CEO, after observing a private signal, can entrench
himself by undertaking an irreversible action that makes it prohibitively costly for the
4Hermalin and Weisbach (1998, p.100) also argue that what matters for the board’s replacement
decision is the quality of the match between the CEO and the ﬁrm, not the CEO’s “ability” per se.
4board to replace him, as in, e.g., Shleifer and Vishny (1989) and other models.5
Technology and Beliefs
Let θ ∈ Θ := [θ,θ] denote the CEO’s private signal and let s ∈ S := [s,s] denote
the ﬁrm’s cash ﬂow under the CEO’s leadership, where s ≥ 0. Each signal gives rise to
a conditional distribution function over cash ﬂows, Gθ(s), with associated density gθ(s),
where Gθ(s) is continuously diﬀerentiable in both s and θ. We assume that the signal is
informative in the sense of the Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property (MLRP), implying
gθ00(s)/gθ0(s) is strictly increasing in s for all θ
00 >θ
0 >θ . Accordingly, the conditional
expected cash ﬂow E[s | θ]: =
R
S sgθ(s)ds is continuous and strictly increasing in θ.
Realistically, whether the ﬁrm’s cash ﬂow under the CEO’s leadership will be high
depends not only on the quality of the match, but also on how dedicated the CEO is to his
job. We consider the following simple eﬀort problem. If the CEO puts in high eﬀort, the
signal θ is distributed according to F(θ) with associated density f(θ) > 0 for all θ. Putting
in high eﬀort is costly, as it implies that the CEO must forgo private beneﬁts B>0.H i g h
eﬀort is, however, essential to make the CEO’s continued leadership valuable for the ﬁrm.
If the CEO puts in low eﬀort, we assume that the signal is θ = θ.D e n o t eb yV> 0 the
ﬁrm’s expected cash ﬂow under a potential replacement CEO.6 We assume that
Z θ
θ
E[s | θ]f(θ)dθ − B>V>E [s | θ]=s. (1)
The second inequality implies that it is eﬃcient to replace the CEO if the lowest signal θ
is realized.7 Note that, in particular, this implies that the CEO should be replaced if he
exerts low eﬀort. As we will argue below, the ﬁrst inequality ensures that eliciting high
eﬀort is optimal.8 Since the ﬁrst inequality also implies that E[s | θ] >V, it follows from
strict monotonicity and continuity of E[s | θ] that there exists a unique interior cutoﬀ
5See, e.g., Bagwell and Zechner (1993), Edlin and Stiglitz (1995), and Fulghieri and Hodrick (2006).
6There is no need to make distributional assumptions about V . What matters is only the ﬁrm’s
expected cash ﬂow under a potential replacement CEO. Note also that V is independent of θ : The signal
θ is match-speciﬁc in the sense that it only indicates whether the incumbent CEO is a good match for the
ﬁrm, but it contains no information as to how good a match a potential replacment CEO might be.
7In addition, that the entire probability mass is on the lowest cash ﬂow s in case θ is realized ensures
that the shape of the optimal contract is driven by the problem of “information-based entrenchment,” and
not by a “standard” eﬀort problem.
8This condition is admittedly strong e rt h a nn e e d e da si to n l ye v a l u a t e sﬁrm proﬁts for the case where
the CEO is never replaced. Making this stronger assumption allows us, however, to avoid further case
distinctions in what follows.
5signal θFB ∈ (θ,θ) given by E[s | θFB]=V such that it is ﬁrst-best optimal to replace the
CEO if and only if θ<θ FB.
CEO Replacement Policy and Compensation Package
We will show later that we can restrict consideration to simple mechanisms that specify
a single on-the-job pay scheme w(s) if the CEO is retained and a ﬁxed severance pay
W if the CEO is replaced.9 (There we will also discuss our restriction to deterministic
mechanisms.) Denote by Θ− ⊂ Θ the set of signals for which the CEO is replaced and by
Θ+ := Θ\Θ− the set of signals for which the CEO is retained. By incentive compatibility,
we have that E[w(s) | θ] ≥ W for all θ ∈ Θ+ and E[w(s) | θ] ≤ W for all θ ∈ Θ−.
We ﬁnally impose two constraints on the CEO’s on-the-job pay scheme. The ﬁrst
constraint is that w(s) ≤ s, i.e., the CEO’s on-the-job pay cannot exceed the ﬁrm’s cash
ﬂow. The second constraint is that w(s) must be nondecreasing. While this second
constraint simpliﬁes the analysis, it does not bind at the optimal solution.
3A n a l y s i s
3.1 Preliminary Analysis
Before setting up the ﬁrm’s maximization problem, it is useful to make some observations
that allow us to shorten the subsequent analysis. Our speciﬁcation of the eﬀort problem
ensures that, by itself, the eﬀort problem is not a source of rent for the CEO. This is
because low eﬀort results in the lowest cash ﬂow s if the CEO is retained. If the CEO
was always retained, the ﬁrm could thus induce him to exert high eﬀort by paying him a
wage equal to his eﬀort cost B for all cash-ﬂows s>s( a n daz e r ow a g ei fs = s). This
would leave the CEO with zero rent. Hence, by always retaining the CEO and inducing
high eﬀort, the ﬁrm can attain a payoﬀ of
Z θ
θ
E[s | θ]f(θ)dθ − B. (2)
As (2) strictly exceeds V by condition (1), and as (2) constitutes a lower boundary of the
ﬁrm’s payoﬀ from inducing high eﬀo r t( a l w a y sr e t a i n i n gt h eC E Om a yn o tb eo p t i m a l ) ,
this implies that it is always optimal for the ﬁrm to induce high eﬀort. To realize a payoﬀ
9That is, (non-degenerate) menus that condition w(s,b θ) and W(b θ) on the (truthfully) revealed signal
b θ = θ are not optimal in our model.
6that is higher than (2), however, the ﬁrm must make use of the CEO’s private information
about his “match value”. For the time being, we assume that it is proﬁtable for the ﬁrm
to elicit the CEO’s private information. Hence, we assume that both Θ+ and Θ− have
positive mass. We will subsequently (in Section 4) provide suﬃcient conditions under
which this is indeed the case.
Note next that the CEO’s conditional expected on-the-job pay E[w(s) | θ] cannot be
independent of θ. In this case it would have to be equal to his severance pay W to ensure
that both Θ+ and Θ− a r en o n - e m p t y . B u tt h e nt h eC E Ow o u l ds t r i c t l yp r e f e rt oe x e r t
low eﬀort. Recall next that w(s) is nondecreasing and that Gθ(s) has full support for all
θ>θ . From First-Order Stochastic Dominance (FOSD), which is implied by MLRP, and
continuity of Gθ(s), it then follows that the CEO’s conditional expected on-the-job pay
E[w(s) | θ] must be continuous and strictly increasing in θ. Together with the assumption
that Θ+ and Θ− have positive mass, this implies that there exists a unique cutoﬀ signal
θ
∗ ∈ (θ,θ) satisfying
E[w(s) | θ
∗]=W. (3)
Hence, by incentive compatibility, we have that Θ+ =[ θ
∗,θ] and Θ− =[ θ,θ
∗).10 For a given
compensation scheme (W,w(s)), condition (3) will thus govern the ﬁrm’s entrenchment
problem.
If the CEO exerts low eﬀort, his payoﬀ will be W + B, given that low eﬀort results
in θ = θ <θ
∗ and thus in the CEO’s replacement. By contrast, if the CEO exerts high
eﬀort, he will only be replaced with probability F(θ
∗). Consequently, exerting high eﬀort
is optimal if
Z θ
θ∗
E[w(s) | θ]f(θ)dθ + F(θ
∗)W ≥ W + B. (4)
The board’s problem is thus to design a compensation scheme (W,w(s)) that maximizes
the ﬁrm’s residual payoﬀ
ω := F(θ
∗)(V − W)+
Z θ
θ∗
E[s − w(s) | θ]f(θ)dθ, (5)
subject to the truthtelling constraint (3) and the incentive constraint (4).
It is straightforward to show that, by optimality, the incentive constraint (4) must
be binding. Inserting the binding IC constraint into (5), the board’s objective function
10Given that θ = θ
∗ is a zero-probability event, it is inconsequential how we break the CEO’s indiﬀerence
in this case.
7becomes
ω =
Z θ
θ∗
E[s | θ]f(θ)dθ + F(θ
∗)V − B − W. (6)
Equation (6) entails two insights. First, as the residual claimant to all cash ﬂows, the ﬁrm’s
payoﬀ is highest if the replacement decision (i.e., the choice of θ
∗) is made eﬃciently. In
fact, if the information captured by θ about the match value between the ﬁrm and the
current CEO was veriﬁable, the optimal replacement policy would specify θ
∗ = θFB.T h e
second insight from (6) is that the expected compensation that the ﬁrm must pay the CEO
is equal to W + B, implying that the CEO earns an (informational) rent of W.T h i s i s
intuitive as the CEO could earn W also when he shirks (in which case he is subsequently
replaced).
We conclude the preliminary analysis with an observation regarding the CEO’s incen-
tive constraint (4). After rewriting (4), we obtain the requirement that
Z θ
θ∗
E[w(s) | θ]
f(θ)
1 − F(θ
∗)
dθ − W ≥
B
1 − F(θ
∗)
. (7)
Hence, to induce the CEO to exert high eﬀort, his expected on-the-job pay (conditional
on θ ≥ θ
∗) must exceed his severance pay by a suﬃcient margin. This required wedge
between the CEO’s on—the-job pay and his severance pay will be the (endogenous) source
for the CEO’s entrenchment in our model, as it biases him towards continuing.11
3.2 Optimal Contract Design
According to the ﬁrm’s objective function (6), which we obtained after substituting the
CEO’s binding incentive constraint, the board has two objectives when designing the op-
timal compensation scheme. First, it wants to make the replacement decision, as captured
by the cutoﬀ signal θ
∗,a se ﬃcient as possible. Second, it wants to minimize the CEO’s
severance pay, as it constitutes a source of rent for the CEO. What makes the board’s
problem non-trivial is that these two objectives are in conﬂict. In fact, without severance
pay, and thus without paying the CEO a rent, there would never be any CEO replace-
ment.12 This follows immediately from the reformulated incentive constraint (7), which
11The required wedge between the CEO’s on-the-job pay and his payoﬀ when leaving the ﬁrm is remi-
niscent of eﬃciency-wage models (e.g., Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984; Yellen, 1994). As will become clear in
what follows, our main results rely only on the fact that such a wedge must exist, but not on the particular
reason for why it must exist.
12Given that E[s | θ]=s this holds, more precisely, for all θ>θ .
8showed that the CEO is biased towards continuing (“entrenchment”). Severance pay is
thus necessary to “bribe” the CEO towards leaving in case of a low match value. As this
is costly, the ﬁrm wants to keep W as low as possible. This is achieved by the optimal
design of the CEO’s on-the-job pay.13
Proposition 1 Suppose the ﬁrm wants to ensure that the CEO is replaced whenever
θ ≤ θ
∗,w h e r eθ <θ
∗ < θ. Then the uniquely optimal compensation package consists
of severance pay W>0 and an on-the-job pay scheme w(s) satisfying w(s)=0for s<b s
and w(s)=s if s ≥ b s, where b s ∈ (s,s).
The uniquely optimal on-the-job pay scheme is a high-powered, discontinuous bonus
scheme that shifts all of the CEO’s on-the-job pay into the highest cash-ﬂow states. The
i n t u i t i o ni sa sf o l l o w s . A sl o wc a s hﬂows are relatively more likely after low values of
θ (due to the fact that Gθ(s) satisﬁes MLRP), a bonus scheme of the sort described in
Proposition 1 minimizes the CEO’s conditional expected on-the-job pay E[w(s) | θ] at
low values of θ.S i n c e t h e c u t o ﬀ signal θ
∗ is determined by E[w(s) | θ
∗]=W, this in
turn implies that relatively less severance pay is needed to implement a given cutoﬀ signal
θ
∗. In other words, a high-powered bonus scheme of the sort described in Proposition 1
minimizes the informational rent that must be granted to the CEO to achieve a given level
of CEO replacement.
While the optimality of high-powered incentive schemes is not novel to the literature,
o u ra r g u m e n ti sd i ﬀerent from previous models. In particular, it is diﬀerent from models
of moral hazard, such as Innes (1990). To see this, note ﬁrst that while in our model
the CEO must also be induced to exert eﬀort, the incentive constraint (4) has no direct
implication for the optimal functional form of w(s),b u to n l yf o rt h eexpected value of
w(s). (See also condition (7), which rephrases the incentive constraint in terms of a wedge
between the CEO’s expected on-the-job pay and his severance pay.)14 From this it follows
that the optimal functional form of w(s) in Proposition 1 is not driven by the problem of
motivating the CEO to work hard, but rather by the problem of inducing him to reveal his
13For Proposition 1, we suppose that it is indeed feasible to implement the particular cutoﬀ signal
θ
∗. Both the question of feasibility and that of optimality of implementing a particular cutoﬀ θ
∗ will be
addressed below.
14In fact, if the signal θ was contractible, there would be many optimal contracts that solve the remaining
eﬀort problem, e.g., a contract paying a ﬁxed wage of w = B/[1−F(θFB)] if the CEO is retained and no
severance pay.
9private information at least cost to the ﬁrm (in terms of necessary severance pay). This
is achieved by making the CEO’s conditional expected on-the-job pay E[w(s) | θ] as steep
as possible. By MLRP, this is in turn achieved by shifting the CEO’s on-the-job pay as
much as possible into high cash-ﬂow states.
While our argument is diﬀerent from previous models, what it shares with some exist-
ing models is that it relies on MLRP (or related assumptions on the distribution of cash
ﬂows). In Innes (1990), for example, in order to reduce agency costs, the principal wants
to maximize the expected payoﬀ diﬀerential between low and high eﬀort, which by MLRP
is achieved by paying the agent only in high cash-ﬂow states. A similar logic also applies
to problems with ex-ante private information (in contrast to our case with interim private
information). For example, Nachman and Noe (1994) show that a high-value ﬁrm prefers
the pooling (ﬁnancing) contract that allows the ﬁrm to retain cash ﬂows for high real-
izations rather than low realizations. By maximizing the expected cash-ﬂow diﬀerential
between the high- and low-value ﬁrm, this reduces the diﬀerential for the investor’s stake,
thereby minimizing the high-value ﬁrm’s underpricing problem.
Before we proceed, Proposition 1 requires a ﬁnal comment. The obtained “live-or-die”
contract with w(s)=0for s<b s and w(s)=s for s ≥ b s is optimal under the restriction
that the CEO’s on-the-job pay cannot exceed the ﬁrm’s cash ﬂow: w(s) ≤ s. (Otherwise,
any additional cash ﬂow could be used to make the pay scheme even more high-powered.)
This same restriction also limits the range of θ
∗ values that can be implemented. To see
this, note that as θ
∗ approaches θ, the likelihood that the CEO will be retained approaches
zero. To satisfy his incentive constraint (4), for any given θ>θ
∗, the CEO’s expected
“reward” if he is retained, E[w(s) | θ] − W>0, would then have to go to inﬁnity, which
is not feasible.15 In what follows, the restriction on the range of feasible θ
∗ values that
this observation implies will, however, not be binding once we solve for the ﬁrm’s optimal
choice of θ
∗ (see also the discussion in Section 4, where this is made more precise).16
15Formally, this follows immediately from rewriting (4) as
R θ
θ∗ [E[w(s) | θ] − W]f(θ)dθ ≥ B.
16A similar comment also applies if the CEO is replaced. While imposing the requirement that W ≤ V
again limits the range of feasible W values (and thus on θ
∗ values according to Proposition 5 below), by
optimality for the ﬁrm, this restriction will not be binding in equilibrium.
103.3 Costly State Falsiﬁcation
As the previous analysis has shown, the cheapest (i.e., information-rent minimizing) way
to implement a given cutoﬀ signal θ
∗ is to shift all of the CEO’s on-the-job pay into the
highest cash-ﬂow states. The resulting discontinuous bonus scheme entails problems of its
own, however. For instance, if the ﬁrm’s cash ﬂow increases only slightly from b s − ε to
b s, the CEO’s pay “jumps” from w(s)=0to w(s)=b s. To the extent that the CEO can
manipulate the ﬁrm’s cash ﬂo w ,h ew i l lh a v es t r o n gi n c e n t i v e st od os o .
We consider a simple variant of the “costly state falsiﬁcation” (CSF) setting by Lacker
and Weinberg (1989).17 We assume the CEO can falsify the ﬁrm’s cash ﬂow at private
cost h(∆), where ∆ = |s0 − s|, and where s0 and s denote the falsiﬁed and true cash
ﬂow, respectively. The cost function h(∆) is assumed to be continuously diﬀerentiable,
nondecreasing, and convex with h(0) = 0 and h0(0) = γ>0. For a given on-the-job pay
scheme w(s), the utility realized by the CEO is then U(s): =m a x s0 [w(s0) − h(|s0 − s|)].
While falsifying cash ﬂows entails private costs for the CEO, the costs to the ﬁrm may
be much larger. Such costs could arise from law suits or loss of reputation, in particular vis-
á-vis providers of capital. If these costs are suﬃciently large, the ﬁrm will optimally want
to ensure that cash ﬂows are never falsiﬁed in equilibrium. This imposes the additional
restriction that w(s) must be everywhere continuous with w(s) ≥ w(s+∆)−h(∆) for all
∆ ≥ 0. At points where w(s) is diﬀerentiable, this implies that the slope of w(s) cannot
exceed γ.18
Proposition 2 Suppose the ﬁrm wants to ensure that the CEO does not falsify cash ﬂows,
which he could do at private costs h(∆) with h0(0) = γ. Then the uniquely optimal com-
pensation package consists of severance pay W>0 and an on-the-job pay scheme w(s)
satisfying w(s)=0if s<b s and w(s)=γ(s − b s) if s ≥ b s,w h e r eb s ∈ (s,s).
Intuitively, Proposition 2 follows immediately from our previous results (in particular,
Proposition 1) after incorporating the additional “no-falsiﬁcation constraint”. Given this
constraint, the optimal contract shifts again as much as possible of the CEO’s on-the-job
pay into the highest cash-ﬂow states. The resulting contract has the “hockey-stick” shape
17See also Dye (1988), Maggi and Rodríguez-Clare (1995), and Crocker and Morgan (1998).
18Clearly, Proposition 2 presumes that the board wants to implement some cutoﬀ θ
∗ >θ(instead of
retaining the CEO for all realizations of θ). It is also presumed that a contract that allows to incentivize
the CEO exists, which, as is shown in Section 4, is always the case if γ is not too small.
11of a standard call option: The CEO obtains zero if the cash ﬂow falls below some hurdle
b s and a share γ of the incremental cash ﬂow s − b s if the cash ﬂow is above b s.
Even if there are no direct costs to the ﬁrm (e.g., reputational costs), cash-ﬂow falsi-
ﬁcation entails indirect costs. As the ﬁrm is the residual claimant, cash-ﬂow falsiﬁcation
reduces the ﬁrm’s ex-ante payoﬀ even if the falsiﬁcation costs are ex post borne by the
CEO. Precisely, because the IC constraint binds, the falsiﬁcation costs must be ultimately
borne by the ﬁr m .W ew i l ln o ws h o wt h a tf o rt h es p e c i a lc a s ew h e r et h em a r g i n a lf a l s i ﬁ-
cation costs are constant with h0(∆)=γ for all ∆ ≥ 0, there will be again no falsiﬁcation
in equilibrium.
The argument is as follows. With constant marginal falsiﬁcation costs, it is possible to
replace any on-the-job pay scheme w(s) that induces falsiﬁcation with a scheme e w(s) ≡
U(s) that gives the CEO the exact same utility for all s and under which the CEO does not
falsify. (The scheme e w(s) is “falsiﬁcation-proof”.) That the CEO’s utility is the same under
w(s) and e w(s) implies that i) if the IC constraint binds under w(s), then it must also bind
under e w(s), and ii) w(s) and e w(s) both implement the same cutoﬀ θ
∗. However, the ﬁrm’s
residual payoﬀ (after inserting the binding IC constraint) is strictly higher under e w(s) than
under w(s); the diﬀerence is the expected falsiﬁcation cost
R θ
θ∗ E[w(s)−U(s) | θ]f(θ)dθ that
the ﬁrm must bear under w(s) but not under e w(s).I ti st h u su n i q u e l yo p t i m a lt om a k e
the contract falsiﬁcation-proof, which in turn implies that the uniquely optimal contract
is characterized by Proposition 2.
To complete the argument, it remains to prove that the CEO does not falsify under
e w(s), so that his utility is indeed e w(s)=U(s) for all s. The CEO does not falsify under
e w(s) if for all s and s00 it holds that e w(s) ≥ e w(s00)−h(|s00 − s|). Substituting e w(s)=U(s)
and using the deﬁnition of U(s) from above, this transforms to
max
s0 [w(s
0) − h(|s
0 − s|)] ≥ max
s0 [w(s
0) − h(|s
0 − s
00|)] − h(|s
00 − s|),
which is satisﬁed if for all s0 it holds that
h(|s
0 − s|) ≤ h(|s
0 − s
00|)+h(|s
00 − s|). (8)
Condition (8) is surely satisﬁed for h(∆)=γ∆.
For other speciﬁcations of h(∆), it may be optimal to allow falsiﬁcation in equilibrium.
To see this most clearly, note that in case of diﬀerentiability we have U0(s)=h0 (|e s(s) − s|),
12where e s(s) is the (possibly falsiﬁed) cash ﬂow chosen by a CEO of “type” s.I f h(∆) is
strictly convex, then by allowing falsiﬁcation in equilibrium (i.e., e s(s) >s ), the CEO’s
utility U(s) can be made “steeper”. As this also implies that his expected payoﬀ E[U(s) | θ]
becomes steeper, it follows from our previous argument that the board can implement a
given cutoﬀ θ
∗with lower severance pay and thus lower rents for the CEO. Whether these
cost savings outweigh the expected falsiﬁcation costs, which are ultimately borne by the
ﬁrm as the residual claimant, depends on the underlying distribution functions Gθ(s) and
F(θ).
The ambiguity as to whether allowing falsiﬁcation is optimal is in accord with the
existing literature. Lacker and Weinberg (1989, Section V) derive suﬃcient conditions
under which the optimal contract allows no falsiﬁcation in equilibrium. Generally, this
i st h ec a s ew h e nt h em a r g i n a lf a l s i ﬁcation costs increase suﬃciently “slowly”, a special
case of which is the technology with constant marginal falsiﬁcation costs analyzed above.
Interestingly, Lacker and Weinberg (1989, p. 1361) note that “the introduction of a binding
falsiﬁcation problem “linearizes” the optimal principal-agent contract for quite general
utility functions, probability distributions, and falsiﬁcation cost functions”. They construct
examples in which the optimal contract is either a linear or a piecewise linear “option-
like” contract, like that in Proposition 2. The diﬀerence between their argument and
ours is the reason for why the optimal contract is (piecewise) linear. While Lacker and
Weinberg consider a risk-sharing problem, in our model the objective is to implement a
given replacement policy (i.e., a given θ
∗) at least cost to the ﬁrm. That said, it is quite
possible that in our model the linearity result would be overturned when introducing either
risk aversion or embedding the problem into a dynamic setting.
Several authors have noted that the optimality of “no falsiﬁcation” in Lacker and
Weinberg (1989) hinges on the assumption that the marginal falsiﬁcation cost at zero is
positive.19 Clearly, if h0(0) = 0, the only falsiﬁcation-proof contract would be a contract in
which w(s) is completely “ﬂat”, which would not allow to incentivize the CEO. Whether
the assumption that h0(0) is bounded away from zero is plausible depends on the con-
text. In the present context, given that legal ramiﬁcations can arise from any cash-ﬂow
falsiﬁcation, no matter how small, we believe this assumption is plausible.
19See, for instance, Dye (1988, p. 200), Maggi and Rodríguez-Clare (1995, footnote 6), and Crocker and
Morgan (1998, p. 367).
13The optimal (falsiﬁcation-proof) contract from Proposition 2 is characterized by an ad-
ditional parameter, γ, representing the marginal falsiﬁcation cost at ∆ =0 . The marginal
cost of falsifying cash ﬂows may depend on the quality of the ﬁrm’s accounting system. If
it is easy for the CEO to falsify cash ﬂows, meaning γ is low, then the quality of the ﬁrm’s
accounting system is poor, and vice versa.
Proposition 3 Consider the falsiﬁcation-proof contract from Proposition 2. As the mar-
ginal cost γ of falsifying cash ﬂows increases, e.g., because of an improvement in the
quality of the ﬁrm’s accounting system, the CEO’s optimal on-the-job pay scheme becomes
“steeper”. As a result, the same replacement policy, namely for all θ ≤ θ
∗, can be accom-
plished with lower severance pay and thus lower informational rents for the CEO.
3.4 Alternative Mechanisms
Thus far we have restricted consideration to simple mechanisms that specify a single on-
the-job pay scheme w(s) and ﬁxed severance pay W. We will now show that, as long as
we restrict consideration to deterministic mechanisms, such simple mechanisms are indeed
uniquely optimal in our model. Note ﬁrst that by incentive compatibility, the CEO must
obtain the same severance pay W(θ)=W for all θ ∈ Θ−. On the other hand, by standard
a r g u m e n t si ti sp o s s i b l et od e v i c ea ni n c e n t i v e - c o m p a t i b l em e n uo fo n - t h e - j o bp a ys c h e m e s
w(s,θ) such that the CEO prefers diﬀerent pay schemes from the menu for diﬀerent θ ∈ Θ+.
This is, however, strictly suboptimal.20
The intuition is straightforward. By construction, the “single” optimal on-the-job pay
scheme from Proposition 1 (or, likewise, Proposition 2) minimizes the CEO’s expected
on-the-job pay at low signals. If the CEO was oﬀered a richer menu w(s,θ), he would for
each θ ∈ Θ+ choose the respective contract from the menu that yields him the highest
payoﬀ. Relative to the “single” optimal on-the-job pay scheme, any richer menu must thus
necessarily shift some of the CEO’s expected on-the-job pay “back” into low-signal states.
By our previous arguments, this implies a lower cutoﬀ θ
∗ for a given level of severance pay
W or, equivalently, it requires a higher severance pay to implement the same cutoﬀ.
20That there are no direct beneﬁts to the ﬁrm from oﬀering a menu follows immediately from the fact
that the board’s action is binary, namely to either retain or replace the CEO. Hence, a ﬁner partition
of Θ− (or Θ+ for that matter) is of no value here. See also Levitt and Snyder (1997), who consider a
similar setting as we do (see Introduction), and who also obtain the result that both the contract under
continuation and the payoﬀ to the agent under cancellation are optimally made independent of the agent’s
interim message (see Proposition 7 on p. 651 and especially Step 2 of the corresponding proof on p. 659).
14Proposition 4 It is strictly suboptimal to make either the CEO’s on-the-job pay or his
severance pay contingent on his reported signal.
Throughout the analysis, we have restricted consideration to deterministic mechanisms.
If we allow for stochastic mechanisms, the ﬁrm can oﬀer an incentive compatible menu
{w(s,θ),W(θ),p(θ)}, where p(θ) denotes the probability with which the CEO is retained.
When revealing his “type” θ, the CEO thus receives the on-the-job pay scheme w(·,θ)
with probability p(θ) and severance pay W(θ) with probability 1 − p(θ). In what follows,
we restrict ourselves to a short, informal discussion of the possible advantages of such
stochastic mechanisms, given that we cannot obtain a general characterization.
Suppose the mechanism speciﬁed some (possibly diﬀerent) p(θ) < 1 for all θ<θ FB.I n
this case, the resulting expected ineﬃciency from (sometimes) retaining the CEO for all
θ ∈ [θ
∗,θ FB) would clearly be strictly lower than if always p(θ)=1for these θ.O n t h e
other hand, as the CEO’s expected reward from non-shirking would then also be lower,
the mechanism would have to adjust such that θ
∗ decreases, which works in the opposite
direction and reduces eﬃciency.21
In addition, a stochastic mechanism can allow to elicit eﬀort at zero c o s t s( i nt e r m so f
rent for the CEO), while still ensuring truthful revelation of θ. We illustrate this in the
rest of this Section.
For this we assume for simplicity that s =0and specify two contracts: w1(s)=βs and
w2(s) with w2(s)=0for s<b s and w2(s)=γ(s−b s) for s ≥ b s. The mechanism prescribes
W(θ)=0as well as, ﬁrst, for θ ≥ θFB that p(θ)=1and w(s,θ)=w2(s) and, second,
for θ<θ FB that p(θ)=p<1 as well as w(s,θ)=w1(s). I ti si m m e d i a t et os h o wt h a t
if θ = θFB is indiﬀerent between (p(θ)=1 ,w 2) and (p,w1), then all other types strictly
prefer the contract that the mechanism prescribes. As long as β ≤ γ the contract is also
falsiﬁcation-proof, while an adequate choice of β and b s ensures that eﬀort is elicited. Note,
in particular, that the CEO now only receives B from shirking and thus zero rent. The
remaining ineﬃciency is furthermore only captured by p>0.
In Levitt and Snyder (1997), who consider a similar problem (cf. the Introduction),
such a stochastic mechanism is shown to implement the ﬁr s tb e s t( i nt h el i m i t )p r o v i d e d
that, as is assumed in their model, the principal has unlimited liability and there is no
21The optimal p(θ) for types θ
∗ ≤ θ ≤ θFB should depend on local characteristics (e.g., of the distribu-
tion function).
15problem of falsiﬁcation. This can also be seen in our illustrative mechanism once we allow
for p → 0 next to specifying now e w1(s)=w1(s)+d for s>s , while leaving e w1(s)=0 ,a n d
letting in turn d →∞ . The constraint w(s) ≤ s as well as that of falsiﬁcation proofness
put, however, a limit on the eﬃciency of such a stochastic mechanism. Generally, we
can not say how the (remaining) ineﬃciency from p>0 compares to the rent saved with
W =0 .
4 Optimal CEO Entrenchment
The remainder of our analysis is based on the contract that is optimal if the ﬁrm wants to
prevent the CEO from falsifying cash ﬂows (see Proposition 2). Thus far we have focused
on the least-cost way to implement a given level of CEO replacement, as captured by the
cutoﬀ θ
∗ below which the CEO will be replaced. In what follows, we examine what it takes
to change the ﬁrm’s level of CEO replacement.
Proposition 5 To induce a higher level of CEO replacement (higher θ
∗), it is necessary
to increase the CEO’s severance pay (higher W). To prevent the CEO from shirking,
the board must, along with increasing his severance pay, simultaneously also increase the
CEO’s on-the-job pay (lower b s).
If the board increases the CEO’s severance pay, then it must also increase his on-the-
job pay. This is necessary to preserve the wedge between the expected on-the-job pay and
the severance pay that is required to satisfy the CEO’s incentive constraint (4). While an
increase in W makes it more attractive for the CEO to leave, the simultaneous increase in
his on-the-job pay has the opposite eﬀect, making it more attractive for the CEO to stay.
Under the optimal compensation scheme the ﬁrst eﬀect outweighs the second, implying
that an increase in W indeed pushes θ
∗ upward.
The intuition is as follows. Under the optimal compensation scheme, the increase in
on-the-job pay that is necessary to match the increase in W occurs at relatively high
cash ﬂows. By MLRP, this implies that the CEO’s expected on-the-job pay E[w(s) | θ]
increases mainly at high signals. On the other hand, E[w(s) | θ] increases only little at
low signals. Hence, while “on average” E[w(s) | θ] increases along with W as required by
(4), it increases by more than W at high signals and by less than W at low signals. At
16low signals, the diﬀerence E[w(s) | θ]−W thus decreases, implying that an increase in W
pushes θ
∗ upward and thus closer towards θFB.
By Proposition 5, a higher level of CEO replacement (higher θ
∗) is accompanied both
by higher on-the-job pay and higher severance pay, implying a higher informational rent
for the CEO. In equilibrium, the board chooses the level of CEO replacement that is ex-
ante optimal for the ﬁrm. Diﬀerentiating the ﬁrm’s expected payoﬀ ω in (6) with respect
to W,w eo b t a i n
dω
dW
= −
dθ
∗
dW
f(θ
∗)[E[s | θ
∗] − V ] − 1, (9)
where dθ
∗/dW > 0 from Proposition 5. (See the Proof of Proposition 5 for an explicit
characterization.)
For our subsequent comparative statics analysis, we will assume that the problem of
maximizing ω is strictly quasiconcave and gives rise to an optimal level of W that induces
CEO replacement with positive probability: θ
∗ >θ .As u ﬃcient condition for θ
∗ to have
an interior solution is that, when starting at θ
∗ = θ, a marginal increase in θ
∗ allows the
ﬁrm to increase its payoﬀ beyond the maximum payoﬀ it can achieve by implementing
θ
∗ = θ. We now formalize this condition with the help of expression (9). For this, we
ﬁrst choose the parameters W and b s of the contract in Proposition 2 so that this contract
implements θ
∗ = θ at least cost. Setting W =0 , we obtain, together with E[w(s) | θ]=0
(from w(s)=0for all s<b s and (1)), that θ
∗ = θ. To satisfy the incentive constraint (4),
the “kink” b s = b s0 must (after integrating by parts) satisfy22
γ
Z θ
θ
µZ s
e s0
[1 − Gθ(s)]ds
¶
f(θ)dθ = B. (10)
Note that a value b s0 >ssatisfying (10) exists if
γ
Z θ
θ
[E[s | θ] − s]f(θ)dθ > B, (11)
which by (1) is clearly the case if γ is not too small.23 (Otherwise, it is not feasible at
all to induce the CEO to exert eﬀort.) We obtain from total diﬀerentiating the CEO’s
22The contract with W =0and b s = b s0 is an optimal contract implementing θ
∗ = θ. Any feasible contract
with w(s)=0=W and under which the IC constraint binds is an optimal contract in this case. Under
any such optimal contract, the ﬁrm’s expected payoﬀ from implementing θ
∗ = θ is
R θ
θ E[s | θ]f(θ)dθ − B.
23For this we simply substitute b s0 = s into (10).
17i n c e n t i v ec o n s t r a i n t( 4 )a n d( t h et r u t h t e l l i n g )c o n d i t i o n( 3 )t h a ta tθ
∗ = θ the marginal
costs of raising θ
∗ equal
dW
dθ
∗
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
θ∗=θ
= γ
Z s
e s0
∂Gθ∗(s)
∂θ
∗
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
θ∗=θ
ds, (12)
while the marginal beneﬁts equal f(θ)(V −s) > 0. Hence, a suﬃcient condition for θ
∗ >θ
to be optimal is that24
dW
dθ
∗
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
θ∗=θ
<f(θ)(V − s). (13)
Depending on the size of γ, there are now two cases that need to be distinguished.
In the ﬁrst case, the uniquely optimal (by strict quasiconcavity) value of W satisﬁes the
ﬁrst-order condition dω/dW =0 . Note here that, after substituting dθ
∗/dW > 0 from
Proposition 5, we have from (9) that E[s | θ
∗] <V ,implying that θ
∗ <θ FB. Hence, there
is always some equilibrium entrenchment under the optimal contract.
In the second case, it holds at the (constrained) optimal solution that dω/dW > 0.
W h i l et h eb o a r dw o u l dl i k et or a i s eW further to increase the cutoﬀ θ
∗, it cannot do
so, because the on-the-job pay scheme already speciﬁes b s = s, i.e., the board cannot
further increase the CEO’s on-the-job pay along with his severance pay as required by the
binding incentive constraint (4).25 From dω/dW > 0 and the previous argument for the
unconstrained case, we then have also presently that there is entrenchment in equilibrium:
E[s | θ
∗] <V. To simplify the exposition of our comparative statics results below, we
would like to rule out this (corner) case. Intuitively, this can be done if γ is not too small.
More precisely, note ﬁr s tt h a tt h eh i g h e s tv a l u eo fθ
∗ that can be implemented through
setting b s = s while satisfying the binding incentive constraint (4) is given by some θ
∗
< θ
solving
γ
Z θ
θ
∗[E[s | θ] − E[s | θ
∗
]]f(θ)dθ = B.
24In terms of model primitives, from (12) we have that condition (13) is surely satisﬁed if
∂Gθ(s)/∂θ|θ=θ =0for all s, implying that a marginal increase in θ at θ = θ has only a second-order
eﬀect on cash ﬂows, in the sense that the cash ﬂow is almost certain to remain E[s | θ]=s for θ
suﬃciently close to θ.
25Note that if s > 0 ,t h eﬁrm could always raise the CEO’s on-the-job pay by stipulating w(s) > 0.T o
s a t i s f y( 4 ) ,t h i sw o u l d ,h o w e v e r ,r e q u i r et oi n c r e a s eW by the same amount and would, in contrast to a
shift in b s, not lead to a change in θ
∗.
18That θ
∗
>θfollows from (11). In analogy to condition (13), we can now rule out the
corner solution where b s = s binds by requiring that
dW
dθ
∗
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
θ∗=θ
∗ >f(θ
∗
)(V − s), (14)
where
dW
dθ
∗
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
θ∗=θ
∗ = γ
Z s
s
∂Gθ∗(s)
∂θ
∗
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
θ∗=θ
∗ ds
in analogy to (12). The following proposition summarizes the preceding discussion.
Proposition 6 Suppose that γ is not too small so that (11) is satisﬁed, which, together
with condition (1), ensures that it is both feasible and optimal to induce the CEO to exert
eﬀort. Then a suﬃcient condition for the optimal cutoﬀ θ <θ
∗ < θ to be characterized by
the ﬁrst-order condition dω/dW =0is that (13) and (14) jointly hold. Moreover, there
will always be some entrenchment in equilibrium as the optimal cutoﬀ satisﬁes θ
∗ <θ FB.
In what follows, we restrict consideration to the case where the suﬃcient conditions
from Proposition 6 hold so that θ
∗ is determined by the ﬁrst-order condition dω/dW =0 .
It is useful to emphasize once more that θ
∗ <θ FB.T h e ﬁrst-order eﬀect on ﬁrm value
from a marginal decrease in θ
∗ at θ
∗ = θFB is zero, while the reduction in the CEO’s
informational rent constitutes a ﬁrst-order cost saving. For all θ ∈ [θ
∗,θ FB), the CEO thus
remains in oﬃce even though it is ex-post ineﬃcient, because the match value under his
leadership is smaller than the ﬁrm value under a replacement CEO. Hence, even under the
optimal contract there will always be some (information-based) entrenchment.
An immediate implication of the preceding analysis is that there would be more en-
trenchment, i.e., a larger “ineﬃciency” gap θFB − θ
∗,i ft h eﬁrm faces a binding cap on
how much severance pay it can give the CEO. Such a cap could result either from policy
intervention or fear of bad publicity, especially if the company is publicly listed. In fact,
both policy makers and the wider public have become increasingly sensitive to high sever-
ance packages, as they are often regarded as “rewards for failure”.26 This is also the case
26A prominent example is the lawsuit by Walt Disney shareholders against the company for awarding
Michael Ovitz severance pay worth $130 million after being only 14 months with Disney. Public pressure
against high severance packages is not limited to the United States. The United Kingdom, for instance,
had a public inquiry about “rewards for failure” (DTI, 2003), and it has witnessed substantial shareholder
activity against high severance packages. As a result, listing rules were amended in 2002 to require ﬁrms
to publish their directors’ remuneration reports, which must be approved by shareholders.
19in our model, where a CEO who shirks can assure himself a payoﬀ equal to his severance
pay W. On the other hand, our model shows that introducing a binding cap on severance
pay may come at a high cost: While it reduces the CEO’s informational rent, it pushes
the cutoﬀ signal θ
∗ downward, thereby leading to more entrenchment.27
5 Comparative Statics Analysis
I nt h ef o l l o w i n g ,w ei n v o k ec o n d i t i o n s( 1 3 )a nd (14) to ensure that the optimally chosen
cutoﬀ signal θ
∗ is always interior. Recall now that E[s | θFB]=V :A tt h eﬁrst-best cutoﬀ
θFB, the expected ﬁrm value under the incumbent CEO is the same as under a potential
replacement CEO. The ﬁrst-best eﬃcient cutoﬀ θFB is thus higher if V increases, implying
a higher expected level of CEO replacement. Intuitively, the same should also hold under
the ﬁrm’s (second-best) optimal replacement policy, once we take into account that θ is
privately observed by the incumbent CEO. As is shown in Proposition 5, to push up the
second-best cutoﬀ signal θ
∗, it is necessary to increase both the CEO’s severance pay and
his on-the-job pay.
Proposition 7 Suppose that, from an ex-ante perspective, it becomes less likely that it is
(ﬁrst-best) eﬃcient to retain the incumbent CEO, given that the expected match value with
a replacement CEO increases (higher V ). Then also in (the second-best) equilibrium, there
will be more CEO turnover, which is accompanied by an increase in both severance pay
and on-the-job pay.
Though an increase in V is associated with both higher (severance and on-the-job)
pay and higher CEO turnover, the former does not represent compensation for the latter.
The existence of such a (compensation) link between higher CEO turnover and higher
pay was suggested by Hermalin (2005). In this case, the required additional pay would
depend on the CEO’s diﬃculty to ﬁnd a new, equally well-paying job. In our model,
the entrenched CEO has to be “induced” not to withhold information that allows the
board to implement a more eﬃcient replacement policy (i.e., a higher cutoﬀ θ
∗). The
required additional pay, in the form of both higher severance pay and higher on-the-job
27As W is set optimally from the ﬁrm’s perspective, any policy intervention would reduce ﬁrm value.
On the other hand, as W represents a pure transfer from the ﬁrm to the CEO, a social planner who is
interested in total welfare should push for a higher W until θ
∗ = θFB.
20pay, represents thus additional rent for the CEO, rather than compensation for higher
disutility and risk. Formally, rearranging (9), we ﬁnd at the optimally chosen cutoﬀ θ
∗
that
dW
dθ
∗ = −[E[s | θ
∗] − V ]
f(θ
∗)
F(θ
∗)
,
capturing the additional pay that is necessary to induce (marginally) higher turnover.
Instead of CEO-speciﬁc attributes (e.g., his disutility from losing his job), the increase
in pay is thus related to ﬁrm-speciﬁc attributes, e.g., through the ﬁrm’s eﬃciency loss
E[s | θ
∗] − V< 0. This may open up a new avenue for explaining the raise in CEO pay
witnessed over the past decades, which has gone hand-in-hand with an increase in CEO
turnover (cf. Hermalin 2005).28
More generally, the positive relation between w(s) and W in Proposition 7 is consistent
with a number of recent empirical studies. Rusticus (2006), Schwab and Thomas (2006),
and Lefanowicz, Robinson, and Smith (2000) all show that CEOs’ severance pay and
golden parachutes are positively related to CEOs’ on-the-job pay.
In the comparative statics analysis in Proposition 7, the ﬁrst-best benchmark θFB
changed due to an increase in V , which then made it optimal to also change the second-
best replacement policy, as captured by the cutoﬀ θ
∗.H o w e v e r , e v e n i f θFB remains
unchanged, the ﬁrm may want to implement a more eﬃcient replacement policy if the
cost to the ﬁrm from having an entrenched CEO is larger. This might be the case, for
example, in larger ﬁrms, given that more ﬁrm value may be lost if the CEO turns out
to be a poor match. To formalize this hypothesis, we scale both the ﬁrm value under a
potential replacement CEO, V, and the cash-ﬂow realization under the incumbent CEO,
s, by some factor α>0.
Proposition 8 An increase in ﬁrm size, α, is associated with higher CEO turnover, higher
severance pay, and higher on-the-job pay.
28Hall and Liebman (1998) document that the mean value of CEO stock option grants has increased
almost sevenfold between 1980 and 1994. Similarly, Bebchuk and Grinstein (2005) ﬁnd that the average
CEO pay among S&P 500 ﬁrms has increased almost threefold between 1993 and 2003. As for severance
pay, Walker (2005) points to a surge in (contractual) severance pay, while Lefanowicz, Robinson, and
Smith (2000) ﬁnd that both the usage and the magnitude of golden parachutes has increased during the
1980s and 90s. For alternative arguments for why CEO pay has increased over the past decades, see
Almazan and Suarez (2003), Bebchuk and Fried (2004), Murphy and Zábojník (2004) or Dow and Raposo
(2005).
21Proposition 8 follows immediately from our previous results together with the fact that
value destruction due to CEO entrenchment is, for a given θ
∗ <θ FB, proportional to ﬁrm
size, as captured by α. Consistent with our results, recent studies have documented that
CEO pay indeed increases with ﬁrm size (e.g., Conyon 1997, Schwab and Thomas 2006,
Bebchuk and Grinstein 2005, and Rusticus 2006). Moreover, Proposition 8 predicts that
this positive relation between ﬁrm size and CEO pay should be additionally associated
with higher CEO turnover.
While in Propositions 7 and 8 a higher turnover likelihood ensues because CEO en-
trenchment becomes more costly to the ﬁrm, the equilibrium level of CEO pay and turnover
should also depend on the CEO’s beneﬁts from becoming entrenched in the ﬁrst place.
Recall that in our model the parameter B captures the private beneﬁts that the CEO
can extract if he shirks. We would expect, for instance, that a more tightly controlled
company leaves its CEO with fewer “toys” (e.g., private jets) and fewer resources that
he can divert for private use if he is no longer fully dedicated to his job. A lower value
of B could thus capture a higher overall quality of corporate governance, which allows to
decrease the CEO’s on-the-job pay while preserving his incentives to exert eﬀort. This
reduces the CEO’s beneﬁts from staying on even if the match value is low. Under the
optimal compensation contract, turnover will then be higher.
Proposition 9 A decrease in the CEO’s private beneﬁts from shirking, which may be the
result of improved corporate governance, leads to less CEO entrenchment (lower θ
∗)a n d
thus more turnover.
6 Renegotiations and “Golden Handshakes”
In our model, the board chooses the CEO’s compensation scheme at the time when he
is hired. The optimal choice trades oﬀ am o r ee ﬃcient replacement policy against higher
r e n t sf o rt h eC E O .T h i st r a d e - o ﬀ is formalized in the derivative of the board’s objective
function with respect to W, equation (9). A key term in this equation is the derivative
dθ
∗/dW, which captures how responsive the cutoﬀ θ
∗ is to a change in the CEO’s severance
pay, and thus his informational rent. The larger dθ
∗/dW is, the cheaper it is for the ﬁrm
to reduce CEO entrenchment and thus narrow the “ineﬃciency gap” θFB−θ
∗ > 0.R e c a l l
also that an increase in severance pay must be matched by a simultaneous increase in on-
22the-job pay to preserve the CEO’s incentives to exert eﬀort. As an increase in on-the-job
pay works, however, in the opposite direction, namely towards a lower cutoﬀ θ
∗,t h i sh a s
ad a m p e n i n ge ﬀect on dθ
∗/dW.
The last observation gives rise to the following problem of renegotiations. Suppose
that after the CEO has exerted eﬀort and privately observed the signal θ,t h eb o a r dc o u l d
oﬀer to replace the initial contract with a new one. Based on the (possibly) renegotiated
contract, the CEO would then play the message game with the board, giving rise to a
cutoﬀ signal θ
∗ that is given by condition (3). The crux is now that at this interim stage
the board strictly beneﬁts from oﬀering the CEO higher severance pay. As this no longer
necessitates a simultaneous increase in on-the-job pay, severance pay is, at this interim
stage, more eﬀective in pushing up θ
∗.( Ceteris paribus, dθ
∗/dW is higher if W is oﬀered
at the interim stage than at the ex-ante stage.)
Proposition 10 If the optimal contract under commitment (see Proposition 2) can be
renegotiated after the CEO has exerted eﬀort and observed his private signal θ,t h e nt h e
board would want to oﬀer the CEO additional severance pay (“golden handshake”) at this
interim stage. Ex-ante, however, the ﬁrm is strictly better oﬀ if it can commit not to
renegotiate the initial contract.
The “golden handshake” that the CEO can expect at the interim stage undermines his
incentives to work hard ex ante. In fact, as the incentive constraint was binding under the
uniquely optimal (commitment) contract from Proposition 2, the CEO will strictly prefer
to shirk if he can expect higher severance pay later.
A stricter corporate governance standard, in particular if backed up regulatory require-
ments, may shore up a board’s commitment not to oﬀer generous “golden handshakes” ex
post. For instance, such commitment could become credible if changes in compensation
must be approved by a compensation committee involving independent board members.
Public pressure and fear of negative publicity, especially in the case of publicly listed
companies, may provide additional commitment for the board not to sweeten the CEO’s
(early) departure.
If we restrict attention to the class of contracts characterized in Proposition 2, then it
is straightforward to derive the equilibrium outcome under renegotiations. The optimal
contract must satisfy both the incentive constraint (4) and, in addition, the requirement
23that it will not be renegotiated later. As this leads to a level of severance pay that is
too high from an ex-ante perspective, the ﬁrm will optimally make the contract “just”
renegotiation-proof. Precisely, the optimal contract will satisfy the ﬁrm’s ﬁrst-order con-
d i t i o n( 9 )a tt h einterim stage. Clearly, the ﬁrm’s proﬁts in this case are strictly lower
than under the optimal commitment contract.
However, we can no longer be certain that the optimal renegotiation-proof contract is
indeed characterized by Proposition 2. While we know that the contract from Proposition
2 implements a given level of entrenchment at lowest cost, it is not clear that it also
provides the best possible commitment against subsequently renegotiating (upwards) the
CEO’s severance pay. As the contract from Proposition 2 makes the CEO’s on-the-job pay
E[w(s) | θ] as steep as possible, ceteris paribus a given change in W induces a relatively
small change in θ
∗, given that the CEO’s beneﬁts from staying in oﬃce increase “faster” in
θ. While this observation would suggest that this is also the optimal renegotiation-proof
contract, this misses an additional eﬀect. Recall that the contract from Proposition 2
implements a given cutoﬀ θ
∗ w i t ht h el o w e s tf e a s i b l ea m o u n to fs e v e r a n c ep a ya n do n -
the-job pay. As is easy to show, a reduction in the level of pay reduces the sensitivity of
E[w(s) | θ] with respect to θ, with the eﬀect that a change in W now induces a larger
change in θ
∗,m a k i n gi tt h u sm o r ea t t r a c t i v ef o rt h eﬁrm to subsequently renegotiate W
upwards. This “level eﬀect” works against the contract from Proposition 2 by making
it more p r o n et ob er e n e g o t i a t e da tt h einterim stage.29 We are not able to generally
characterize the optimal contract under renegotiations.
7B e t t e r I n f o r m e d B o a r d
Model Variation
Thus far we have assumed that the CEO has better information than the board about
the match quality between him and the ﬁrm. This assumption is based on the natural
notion that the CEO knows best his own strengths and weaknesses, especially what cor-
porate environments his personality is best suited for (albeit it may take him some time to
29By the same token, it can no longer be assured that the incentive constraint (4) binds under the
optimal contract. This is because higher on-the-job pay makes it subsequently more costly to implement
ah i g h e rc u t o ﬀ θ
∗ by raising W,g i v e nt h a tE[w(s) | θ] becomes more sensitive to θ. Hence, the ﬁrm may
end up paying the CEO a higher rent, which induces more entrenchment, than what would otherwise be
“necessary” to induce high eﬀort.
24fully learn the ﬁrm’s environment.) Alternatively, it could be that the board, because it
knows the ﬁrm’s environment better than the newly hired CEO, is better informed about
the match quality between the CEO and the ﬁr m( a l b e i ti tm a yt a k et h eb o a r ds o m et i m e
to get to know the CEO’s personality.) To explore this latter possibility, we now consider
t h eo p p o s i t ec a s ei nw h i c ht h eb o a r d ,i n s t e a do ft h eC E O ,p r i v a t e l yo b s e r v e sθ.30,31 By
implication, the choice for which values of θ the CEO will be replaced now depends directly
on the board’s preferences. In contrast, in our basic model where θ was observed only by
the CEO, the cutoﬀ signal θ
∗ was determined by the CEO’s preferences, as reﬂected in the
requirement that E[w(s) | θ
∗]=W from (3).
Board’s Replacement Policy
The board, acting in the ﬁrm’s best interest, will retain the CEO if the expected residual
proﬁt, E[s−w(s) | θ], exceeds the proﬁt under a replacement CEO, V −W.I nt h ef o l l o w i n g ,
we impose an additional, albeit fairly standard, constraint, namely, that s − w(s) must
be nondecreasing (e.g., Innes 1990).32 By the same logic as in the previous analysis, it
then follows from MLRP and continuity of Gθ(s) that E[s−w(s) | θ] is strictly increasing
θ.A l s o ,l i k e b e f o r e ,w e ﬁrst assume that both Θ+ and Θ− have positive mass and then
show later under what conditions this will be the case. Accordingly, the board’s optimal
replacement policy is characterized by a unique interior cutoﬀ signal θ
∗
Board satisfying
E[s − w(s) | θ
∗
Board]=V − W. (15)
N o t et h a tt h eC E O ’ si n c e n t i v ec o n s t r a i n t( 4 )r e m a i n su n c h a n g e d ,e x c e p tt h a tw en e e d
to substitute the board’s optimal cutoﬀ θ
∗
Board. I nw h a tf o l l o w s ,i tp r o v e sc o n v e n i e n tt o
refer to the previously optimal cutoﬀ when the CEO had private information by θ
∗
CEO (see
condition (3)).
30If both the board and the CEO could observe θ, while assuming that θ is non-veriﬁable, then the ﬁrm
would beneﬁt( a l s oex-ante) from allowing interim (re-)negotiations. If instead only the CEO observes θ,
we have shown in Proposition 10 that the ﬁrm would like to commit not to renegotiate. As we will show in
this section, if only the board can observe θ, then the optimal commitment contract is renegotiation-proof.
31In the Introduction we provide an alternative interpretation of the assumption that the board observes
θ based on the complementary role of boards as advisors to the CEO, as emphasized in Adams and Ferreira
(2007).
32If we assume that γ ≤ 1, then this constraint is already implied by our previous requirement that w(s)
must be falsiﬁcation-proof. Like the previous requirement that w(s) is nondecreasing, the requirement
that s−w(s) is nondecreasing is only invoked to shorten the subsequent derivation of results and will not
bind in equilibrium.
25As the ﬁrm is the residual claimant, from an ex-ante perspective it would again be
optimal to specify θ
∗
Board = θFB. But this is not necessarily the board’s ex-post optimal
choice. To see this most clearly, suppose ﬁrst that W =0 . In this case, it holds that
E[w(s) | θ] >Wfor all θ>θ , and thus, in particular, that E[s − w(s) | θFB] <V− W.
Hence, the board would strictly prefer to replace the CEO at θ = θFB. Consequently, if
W =0 , the equilibrium cutoﬀ θ
∗
Board must be higher than the ﬁrst-best cutoﬀ θFB for any
contract w(s) that satisﬁes the CEO’s incentive constraint (4).
This result provides the perfect mirror image to the corresponding result for the pre-
viously analyzed case where the CEO observes θ. The intuition is, however, the same.
It rests on the notion that, in order to induce the CEO to exert eﬀort, he must receive
(ex-post) rents when he stays in oﬃce. While this biases the CEO towards staying, it
creates the opposite bias for the board.
On-the-Job Pay
Based on the preceding argument, it follows intuitively that the optimal on-the-job pay
scheme must be again characterized by Proposition 2. Since θ
∗
Board is too high (relative to
the ﬁrst-best cutoﬀ θFB), the goal of the optimal contract design is now to reduce θ
∗
Board.
For a given level of severance pay W,i ft h eo p t i m a lo n - t h e - j o bp a ys c h e m ed i dn o tf o l l o w
the characterization in Proposition 2, then it would be possible to shift the CEO’s on-the-
job pay w(s) further into high cash-ﬂow states, thus shifting his expected on-the-job pay
E[w(s) | θ] further into high signal (i.e., θ) states. This would reduce the board’s optimal
cutoﬀ θ
∗
Board and push it closer to θFB.
(Optimal) Severance Pay
As for severance pay, there is an interesting diﬀerence compared to the previous case
where the CEO had private information. In the previous case, there was a strictly positive
relation between severance pay W and the optimal cutoﬀ θ
∗
CEO. While now a given cutoﬀ
θ
∗
Board is still associated with a unique compensation package (W, b s), provided that w(s)
follows the characterization in Proposition 2, the relation between θ
∗
Board and W may
now no longer be everywhere monotonic. Condition (15), which pins down θ
∗
Board,w o u l d
suggest that to implement a lower cutoﬀ W must increase. But this leaves the on-the-job
pay w(s) constant. Crucially, as long as θ
∗
Board >θ FB and thus E[w(s) | θ
∗
Board] >W
holds, a reduction in θ
∗
Board relaxes the CEO’s incentive constraint (4). If this eﬀect is
26suﬃciently strong, then a lower θ
∗
Board may be compatible with both lower on-the-job pay
and lower severance pay. Note, however, that as severance pay is costly, at the ﬁrm’s
optimal choice of W, provided that this is interior with W>0, the more “direct” channel
must be stronger such that dθ
∗
Board/dW < 0.A st h eﬁrst-order eﬀect of a marginal change
of θ
∗
Board at θ
∗
Board = θFB on the ﬁrm’s proﬁts is zero, it then follows that also if W>0
is optimal, there is still entrenchment in equilibrium: θ
∗
Board >θ FB.( R e c a l lt h a tw eh a v e
already shown that θ
∗
Board >θ FB holds for W =0 .)33
Equilibrium
Note that these observations all presume that a solution to the board’s program exists.
Unlike previously, condition (1) is, however, no longer suﬃcient to ensure that it is indeed
optimal to elicit the CEO’s eﬀort. To obtain a lower boundary for the ﬁrm’s expected
proﬁti ft h eC E Oe x e r t se ﬀort, suppose that the board chooses W so as to implement
θ
∗
Board = θFB. In this case, the “kink” b s0 that characterizes the CEO’s optimal on-the-job
pay must solve
γ
Z θ
θFB
Z s
e s0
[GθFB(s) − Gθ(s)]dsf(θ)dθ = B, (16)
while the corresponding severance pay W0 is given by
W0 = E[w(s) | θFB]=γ
Z s
e s0
[1 − GθFB(s)]ds.
The requirement that the ﬁrm’s expected proﬁts ω exceed V is then given by34
Z θ
θ∗
E[s | θ]f(θ)dθ + F(θ
∗)V − B − W0 >V . (17)
Note that this assumes that such a contract is indeed feasible, i.e., that a solution b s0 >s
for (16) indeed exists. From (16) this is the case if
γ
Z θ
θFB
Z s
s
[GθFB(s) − Gθ(s)]dsf(θ)dθ > B. (18)
33Admittedly, these observations hide some further technicalities. Note that the ﬁrm chooses W,w h i c h
together with some w(s) pins down the unobserved chosen cutoﬀ θ
∗
Board. However, for given W multiple
choices of w and thus θ
∗
Board may be compatible with the binding constraint (4). (As θ
∗
Board changes
continuously in W and b s, note that it is again immediate that (4) binds by optimality.) If all compatible
choices of w lead to values θ
∗
Board ≥ θFB, then by optimality the board will, for given W, choose the
(lowest) on-the-job pay scheme, corresponding also to the lowest cutoﬀ,i nw h i c hc a s ew ec a nt a l ko fa
functional relationship between W and θ
∗
Board. The argument in the main text is then further restricted
to the case where at an interior optimum W>0 this function is continuously diﬀerentiable.
34Clearly, condition (17) is satisﬁed if B is suﬃciently small as this aﬀects ω both directly and indirectly
via a reduction of W0 (with W0 → 0 and B → 0).
27Proposition 11 Suppose instead of the CEO it is now the board who privately observes θ.
Suppose also that γ is not too small such that (18) is satisﬁed in addition to (17), ensuring
that it is both feasible and optimal to induce the CEO to exert eﬀort. Then we have the
following results:
i) The optimal on-the-job pay scheme w(s) (still) follows the characterization in Proposi-
tion 2.
ii) The board optimally chooses the CEO’s compensation package such that θ
∗
Board >θ FB,
implying that there is ineﬃciently high CEO turnover.
iii) If it is optimal to oﬀer a strictly positive severance pay W>0, then at the thereby
implemented cutoﬀ it holds that dW/dθ
∗
Board < 0: To (locally) narrow the ineﬃciency gap
θ
∗
Board − θFB > 0, the board would have to increase the CEO’s severance pay.
Note that Proposition 11 does not assert that W>0 holds generally under the optimal
contract. Whether W has an interior solution will depend on how the marginal eﬃciency
gain from a decrease in θ
∗
Board (recall that θ
∗
Board <θ FB) compares with the marginally
higher rent that must be left to the CEO.35
Discussion
By Proposition 11, for the case where the board privately observes θ, implying that
the CEO is replaced ineﬃciently often, the use of severance pay makes it credible that the
CEO is replaced less frequently, thus improving eﬃciency. As noted in the Introduction,
in Almazan and Suarez (2003) severance pay also beneﬁts the CEO, albeit in their model
symmetric information ensures that the board’s replacement decision is always ﬁrst-best
eﬃcient, in contrast to our model. However, by aﬀecting the renegotiation outcome be-
tween the CEO and the board, severance pay can provide the CEO with stronger ex-ante
eﬀort incentives than incentive pay.36 Closer to our setting, in Berkovitch, Israel, and
Spiegel (2000) severance pay also commits against ineﬃcient replacement. In their model,
a replacement CEO, whose ability is unknown, makes ﬁrm value more uncertain, which is
beneﬁcial to shareholders if the ﬁrm is levered.
35As u ﬃcient condition for W>0 can be derived in analogy to condition (13), albeit now the corre-
sponding condition −dW/dθ
∗ <f(θ
∗)[E[w(s) | θ
∗] − V ] must hold at θ
∗ = θ
∗
Board >θ FB that applies for
W =0 .
36Though they do not focus on severance pay, Fisman, Khurana, and Rhodes-Kropf (2005) also consider
a model in which the board may replace the CEO ineﬃciently often. In their model, however, this is
because the board gives in to the misguided activism of misinformed and biased shareholders.
28Comparative Analysis
We next compare the outcome with a “weak board”, where the board needs to elicit
the CEO’s private information, to that with a “strong board”, where this information lies
with the board.
Corollary 1 Comparing the two regimes where either the CEO or the board observes θ,
we have the following results:
i) Under the optimal compensation package, there is strictly more CEO turnover if the
board observes θ, i.e., it holds that θ
∗
Board >θ FB >θ
∗
CEO.
ii) If the CEO observes θ, then higher severance pay is associated with higher CEO
turnover. If the board observes θ, then, at least locally at an interior solution, higher
severance pay is associated with lower CEO turnover.
There are thus two key distinctions between the two regimes. First, ceteris paribus,
there is strictly more CEO turnover if the board observes θ. Second, the relationship
between severance pay and CEO turnover, which is always positive if the CEO observes
θ, may have the opposite sign if the board is “informationally” strong. A brief caveat is
in order. Any comparison between the two regimes is based on the assumption that all
primitives of the model remain ﬁxed. In a richer model, however, the question of who
has private information about the match value might itself be endogenous (depending, for
instance, on the model’s primitives such as V or F(θ).37
We conclude the comparison between the two regimes with the following result.
Proposition 12 S u p p o s ei n s t e a do ft h eC E Oi ti sn o wt h eb o a r dw h op r i v a t e l yo b s e r v e s
θ. Then the optimal (commitment) contract from Proposition 11 will not be renegotiated
at the interim stage.
This result stands in contrast to the discussion in Section 6. If the board has private
information, the ﬁrm thus no longer beneﬁts from tying the board’s hands to prevent it
from renegotiating the contract with the CEO. To see why this holds, suppose that the
37A drawback of our approach with a continuum of signals θ and a continuum of cash-ﬂow realizations
s is that we cannot explicitly compare the ﬁrm’s proﬁts under the two regimes. Given that the optimal
choice of W depends on “local” conditions such as the densities f(θ) or Gθ(s) to the left and right of
θ = θFB, it is generally not possible to compare the respective optimal levels of W (or, for that matter,
the remaining ineﬃciencies).
29CEO could make a new oﬀer at the interim stage, i.e., after he exerted eﬀort and after
the board observed θ.38 Though from θ
∗
Board >θ FB there would be strict gains from
renegotiating as long as θ ∈ [θ
∗
Board,θ FB),t h i si sn o tf e a s i b l ea sθ is the boards’s private
information. Any “wage cut” that the CEO oﬀered so as to push down θ
∗
Board would also be
preferred by all “board types” θ>θ
∗
Board. This follows in turn as by construction the initial
contract from Proposition 2 makes the CEO’s compensation as steep as possible, implying
that if any other contract that is oﬀered at the renegotiation stage was preferred by some
type θ
0, it would be strictly preferred by all higher types θ>θ
0.39 However, if the CEO
preferred an on-the-job compensation that was less attractive but that would implement
a lower cutoﬀ θ
∗
Board, then this would contradict optimality of the initial (commitment)
contract.
8C o n c l u s i o n
This paper develops a new theory of “information based” entrenchment. The on-the-job
pay that the CEO must be oﬀered to keep him from shirking biases him towards staying
on even if his “match value” with the ﬁrm is strictly below that of a potential replacement
CEO. If the CEO has private information about this match value, then this bias will lead
to entrenchment: The CEO is replaced less often than he should be. We showed that CEO
entrenchment can be reduced with severance pay, albeit higher severance pay has to go
hand-in-hand with higher on-the-job pay. Absent any further restrictions, the optimal on-
the-job pay scheme is a high-powered, discontinuous bonus scheme. We showed, however,
that if the CEO can (at private costs) falsify cash ﬂows, then under some circumstances
the optimal on-the-job pay becomes a piecewise linear (option-type) contract.
We derived several implications from this model. In terms of public policy as well as
corporate governance, we showed that while imposing a cap on the ex-ante negotiated
severance pay is against the ﬁrm’s interest as it ineﬃciently reduces turnover, a commit-
ment not to pay ex-post “golden handshakes” enhances ﬁrm value. In our model, the
expectation of “golden handshakes” undermines the CEO’s incentives to work hard.
38As this is only “cheap talk”, we may also suppose that this is preceded by the board’s announcement
whether it intends to replace the CEO or not. However, the board only makes its ﬁnal decision after it
accepted or rejected the CEO’s new oﬀer. In addition, the subsequent arguments extend to the case where
the board can make a new oﬀer at the interim stage, which leads to a game of signaling.
39From θ
∗
Board >θ FB there are clearly no mutual gains from renegotiating severance pay.
30Our model also predicts a positive correlation between CEO turnover and pay. In
contrast to extant theory, however, the increase in pay does not represent compensation
for the CEO’s higher risk of being ﬁred, but represents additional rent. As we argued,
in our theory the respective pay level (or pay rise) would thus be linked rather to ﬁrm
characteristics than to characteristics of the CEO’s job market. Other predictions that we
obtained from the model included a positive correlation between ﬁrm size and both pay
and CEO turnover.
Our analysis thus enriches the extant theory on (optimal) CEO turnover. CEO en-
trenchment creates a wedge between the ﬁrm’s eﬃcient replacement decision and observed
turnover. This should be taken into consideration when forming hypotheses about the
f a c t o r st h a ta ﬀect CEO turnover. Also, our analysis showed how the risk of entrenchment
and thus ineﬃcient turnover should inﬂuence the optimal design of CEO compensation,
i.e., both the level of severance pay and on-the-job pay as well as the optimal form of
on-the-job pay.
9 Appendix
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 .The fact that W>0 f o l l o w sf r o mt h ea r g u m e n ti nt h em a i n
text. We next prove that it is uniquely optimal to give the CEO an on-the-job pay scheme
of the form w(s)=0if s<ˆ s and w(s)=s if s ≥ ˆ s for some ˆ s ∈ (s,s).
We argue to a contradiction. Suppose it was optimal to implement a given cutoﬀ signal
θ
∗ with a diﬀerent on-the-job pay scheme e w(s), and denote the corresponding severance
pay by f W. We show that there then exists some on-the-job pay scheme w(s) such that
(i) the incentive constraint (4) remains binding and (ii) we can still implement the same
θ
∗–though now with a lower severance pay W. That is, in a slight abuse of notation, we
show that the new on-the-job pay scheme satisﬁes θ
∗(w,W)=θ
∗(e w,f W)=θ
∗ and W<f W,
which by inspection of (6), contradicts the optimality of e w(s).
We proceed in two steps. We ﬁrst choose W = f W and w(s) with w(s)=0for s<b s0
and w(s)=s for s ≥ b s0 such that θ
∗(w,W)=θ
∗. That is, deﬁning ∆(s): =e w(s) − w(s),
we have that Z s
s
∆(s)gθ∗(s)ds =0 . (19)
Given the construction of w(s), there exists a value e s ∈ (s,s) such that ∆(s) ≥ 0 for all
31s<e s and ∆(s) ≤ 0 for all s>e s, where both inequalities are strict over sets of positive
measure. Take now any signal b θ>θ
∗.B yM L R Po fGθ(s) and (19), it then holds that
Z s
s
∆(s)ge θ(s)ds =
Z h s
s
∆(s)gθ∗(s)
ge θ(s)
gθ∗(s)
ds +
Z s
h s
∆(s)gθ∗(s)
ge θ(s)
gθ∗(s)
ds (20)
<
ge θ(e s)
gθ∗(e s)
Z
S
∆(s)gθ∗(s)ds =0 ,
which implies the incentive constraint (4) is slack under w(s) and W.
In a second step, we can now construct the asserted pay scheme with w(s)=0for s<b s
and w(s)=s for s ≥ b s and W<W = f W. In order to do this, we continuously increase the
threshold b s0 in w(s) and decrease W, while still satisfying θ
∗(w,W)=θ
∗,u n t i l( 4 )a g a i n
binds. Here, existence of a solution to the respective two equations (namely, the binding
constraint (4) and the requirement that E[w(s) | θ
∗]=W) is ensured from continuity of
all payoﬀsi nb s0 as well as W and the fact that (4) is violated as b s0 → s.40 Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 .By the argument in the main text, the manipulation problem
adds one additional constraint to the maximization problem: The slope of w(s) must not
exceed γ.41 As in the proof of Proposition 1 we argue to a contradiction. Suppose thus that
to implement a given cutoﬀ signal θ
∗ ad i ﬀerent on-the-job pay scheme e w(s) was chosen.
Like in the proof of Proposition 1, we can then again construct w(s) with w(s)=0for
s<b s0 and w(s)=γ(s −b s0) for s ≥ b s0 satisfying the following conditions. First, (19) must
be satisﬁed. Second, as e w(s) must be continuous and as (where diﬀerentiable) the slope
of e w(s) cannot exceed γ, we have again a value e s ∈ (s,s) such that ∆(s) ≥ 0 for all s<e s
and ∆(s) ≤ 0 for all s>e s, where both inequalities are strict over sets of positive measure.
We can now fully apply the ﬁnal steps from the proof of Proposition 1. To see this,
note that the step in (20) only relies on the just described properties of the function ∆(s).
Hence, we have again that the incentive constraint (4) is slack under (w(s),W),w h i c h
then allows to construct a more proﬁtable contract with a lower severance pay.
Uniqueness of (W, b s) follows as from substituting (3) into the binding constraint (4) it
must hold that
γ
Z θ
θ∗
∙Z s
e s
[Gθ∗(s) − Gθ(s)]ds
¸
f(θ)dθ =0 , (21)
40The equation system may have more than one solution. In this case, the ﬁrm strictly prefers the one
with the lowest value of W.
41From convexity of h(·) this will also ensure that the resulting (piecewise linear) compensation scheme
is indeed falsiﬁcation-proof.
32where we used that E[w(s) | θ]=γ
R s
e s [1 −Gθ(s)]ds. Condition (21) gives thus indeed rise
to a unique value b s, which from (3) leads to a unique value W.42 Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 . By Proposition 2, an increase in γ increases the slope of the
optimal on-the-job pay scheme to the right of the (adjusted) threshold b s. It remains to
prove that as γ increases, implementing a given cutoﬀ signal θ
∗ requires a lower amount
of severance pay.
To prove this, we totally diﬀerentiate (3), which pins down θ
∗, and the binding con-
straint (4) to obtain (holding θ
∗ ﬁxed)
dW
dγ
=
R θ
θ∗
hR s
e s [[1 − Gθ(b s)][1 − Gθ∗(s)] − [1 − Gθ∗(b s)][1 − Gθ(s)]]ds
i
f(θ)dθ
R θ
θ∗ [Gθ∗(b s) − Gθ(b s)]f(θ)dθ
. (22)
The denominator of (22) is positive as Gθ(s) satisﬁes FOSD, which is implied by MLRP.
That the numerator is negative follows ﬁnally as [1 − Gθ(s)]/[1 − Gθ∗(s)] is strictly in-
creasing in s for all θ>θ
∗. To see that this indeed implied by MLRP, note that as Gθ(s)
is diﬀerentiable, this is equivalent to requiring that gθ(s)/[1−Gθ(s)] is strictly decreasing
in θ for any given s ∈ (s,s). It is well known that this condition (the Monotone Hazard
Rate Property), is indeed implied by MLRP. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4. Note ﬁrst that we can again restrict consideration to on-the-
job pay schemes w(s,θ) that are strictly increasing in s on a set of positive measure.
In conjunction with the fact that Gθ(s) satisﬁes MLRP, truthtelling then implies that
Θ− =[ θ,θ
∗) and Θ+ =[ θ
∗,θ] with E[w(s,θ
∗) | θ
∗]=W. The following auxiliary result
follows now immediately from the Proof of Proposition 1.
Claim 1. Take two diﬀerent feasible on-the-job pay schemes e w(s) and b w(s) such that
b w(s)=0for s<b s and b w(s)=s for s ≥ b s. If E[b w(s) | θ
0] ≥ E[e w(s) | θ
0] for some θ
0 < θ,
then E[b w(s) | θ
0] >E [e w(s) | θ
0] for all θ>θ
0.
To complete the proof, we must distinguish between two cases. If w(s,θ
∗) satisﬁes
w(s,θ
∗)=0for s<b s and w(s,θ
∗)=s for s ≥ b s, Claim 1 and truthtelling imply that the
same on-the-job pay scheme is also chosen for all θ ≥ θ
∗. That is, the optimal menu is
42It is useful to point here to a diﬀerence to the proof of Proposition 1. There, the respective system of
equations (namely, the binding constraint (4) and E[w(s) | θ
∗]=W) may still have multiple solutions, of
which only that with the lowest W is optimal.
33degenerate with w(s,θ)=w(s,θ
∗). Suppose next that w(s,θ
∗) takes a diﬀerent form as
above. As in the Proof of Proposition 1, we can then construct a single on-the-job pay
scheme b w(s) satisfying b w(s)=0for s<b s and b w(s)=s for s ≥ b s such that the same cutoﬀ
signal θ
∗ is implemented while the eﬀort constraint is relaxed. This follows from the fact
that E[b w(s) | θ] >E [w(s,θ) | θ] for all θ>θ
∗, which in turn follows from Claim 1 and the
truthtelling requirement for the original menu. As in Proposition 1, we can ﬁnally adjust
the new (single) on-the-job pay scheme b w(s) so as to implement θ
∗ with a lower severance
pay. Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5 . Totally diﬀerentiating (3), which pins down θ
∗,a n dt h ec o n -
straint (4) while substituting the optimal on-the-job compensation scheme from Proposi-
tion 2 yields
dθ
∗
dW
= −
1
γ
R θ
θ∗ [Gθ∗(b s) − Gθ(b s)]f(θ)dθ
hR s
e s
∂Gθ∗(s)
∂θ∗ ds
ihR θ
θ∗ [1 − Gθ(b s)]f(θ)dθ
i. (23)
To evaluate the sign of (23), note that MLRP implies that Gθ(s) is decreasing in θ for
all s ∈ (s,s), implying that dθ
∗/dW > 0. That on-the-job pay must then increase as
well, through a reduction of b s, follows immediately from (4). (Note for this also that from
E[w(s) | θ
∗]=W the ﬁrst-order eﬀect of the initiated change in θ
∗ on
R θ
θ∗ E[w(s) | θ]f(θ)dθ
is zero.) Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 7. We show that the optimal choice of W is strictly increasing in
V . By the argument in Proposition 5 this implies that the corresponding optimal choice of
θ
∗ is also strictly increasing, together with the value of on-the-job pay (through a reduction
in b s). Writing out explicitly the ﬁrst-order condition from (9), we have that
−
dθ
∗
dW
f(θ
∗)[E[s | θ
∗] − V ] − 1=0 . (24)
Implicit diﬀerentiation of (24) gives
dW
dV
= −
dθ
∗
dW
f(θ
∗)
1
d2ω/dW2 > 0,
where d2ω/dW2 < 0 must hold at an interior optimum. (Note that we also use strict
quasiconcavity of ω for uniqueness of the optimal W and thus θ
∗.) Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n8 . In analogy to the proof of Proposition 7 we only have to
show that the optimal choice of W is strictly increasing in α.F o rt h i sn o t eﬁrst that the
34ﬁrst-order condition (24) now becomes
−
dθ
∗
dW
f(θ
∗)α[E[s | θ
∗] − V ] − 1=0 , (25)
while we can still substitute dθ
∗/dW from (23). Implicit diﬀerentiation of (25) gives
dW
dα
=
dθ
∗
dW
f(θ
∗)[E[s | θ
∗] − V ]
1
d2ω/dW2 > 0,
where we now used from Proposition 6 that E[s | θ
∗] <Vmust hold from θ
∗ <θ FB.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 9. We show ﬁrst that in order to implement a given cutoﬀ signal
θ
∗, the higher is B the higher must also be the severance pay W. We totally diﬀerentiate
(3), which determines θ
∗, and the constraint (4) to obtain
dW
dB
=
1 − Gθ∗(b s)
R θ
θ∗ [Gθ∗(b s) − Gθ(b s)]f(θ)dθ
> 0, (26)
where the sign follows again from MLRP of Gθ(s), which implies FOSD.
Take now some value B = b B . The optimal compensation package speciﬁes an amount
of severance pay W = c W and some on-the-job pay scheme w(s)= b w(s),w h i c hi si nt u r n
characterized by a unique threshold b s = b s0. Denote the corresponding cutoﬀ signal by
θ
∗ = b θ
∗
.I fB = e B>b B, we know from (26) that in order to implement the same cutoﬀ
signal θ
∗ = b θ
∗
, the severance pay would have to increase to some value W = f W satisfying
f W>c W. To still satisfy (4), the CEO’s expected on-the-job pay must also increase, i.e.,
the new threshold b s = b s00 must satisfy b s00 < b s0.
Consider next dω/dW from (9). By construction, we have for B = b B, b s = b s0, W = c W,
and θ
∗ = b θ
∗
that the derivative is just zero. (This is just the ﬁrst-order condition.) We now
want to evaluate the sign of the derivative when we substitute B = e B, b s = b s00, W = f W,a n d
θ
∗ = b θ
∗
, i.e., we want to evaluate the sign of the derivative at the point where with higher
private beneﬁts the same cutoﬀ signal is implemented, albeit with higher severance pay
and a higher expected on-the-job pay. We show that the derivative (9) is then negative.
This is the case if at θ
∗ = b θ
∗
the derivative dθ
∗/dW is strictly lower when B = e B and
thus W = f W and b s = b s00.G i v e nt h a tb s00 < b s0, this in turn holds if the derivative (23) is
strictly increasing in b s. To show that this is the case, we rearrange (23) to obtain
dθ
∗
dW
=
1
γ
Ã
−1
R s
e s
∂Gθ∗(s)
∂θ∗ ds
!⎛
⎝
R θ
θ∗ [Gθ∗(b s) − Gθ(b s)]f(θ)dθ
hR θ
θ∗ [1 − Gθ(b s)]f(θ)dθ
i
⎞
⎠. (27)
35The ﬁrst expression in parentheses is positive by dGθ∗(b s)/dθ
∗ < 0, which is implied by
FOSD and thus by MLRP, strictly increasing in b s. Next, after some transformations, we
have that the sign of the derivative of the last term in (27) with respect to b s is given by
the expression
Z θ
θ∗
[gθ∗(b s)[1− Gθ(b s)] − gθ(b s)[1− Gθ∗(b s)]]f(θ)dθ > 0. (28)
The fact that (28) is also strictly positive follows again from MLRP, which implies the
Monotone Hazard Rate Property: gθ(s)/[1−Gθ(s)] must be strictly decreasing in θ for all
s ∈ (s,s). Hence, we have shown that given B = e B, if we evaluate (9) at the value W = f W
where θ
∗ = b θ
∗
, then the derivative is strictly negative. Given strict quasiconcavity of the
objective function, ω,a n dt h ef a c tt h a tθ
∗ (and thus, in particular, b θ
∗
) is interior, we thus
have that for B = e B the optimal severance pay must be strictly lower than W = f W.A sf W
was constructed to ensure that the cutoﬀ stays unchanged after an increase to e B>b B,t h i s
implies from Proposition 5 that under the optimal compensation package there is more
entrenchment if B = e B than if B = b B<e B. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 10. It is straightforward from θ
∗ <θ FB that at the interim stage
the ﬁrm could only beneﬁtf r o mo ﬀering a still higher severance pay. (Any other oﬀer
would, if accepted, only result in a windfall proﬁtf o rt h eC E O . )A tt h einterim stage the
derivative of the ﬁrm’s proﬁts ω with respect to W is given by
−
dθ
∗
dW
f(θ
∗)[E[s | θ
∗] − V ] − F(θ
∗),
where we used that E[w(s) | θ
∗]=W. This is clearly strictly higher than (9) if the
respective function dθ
∗/dW > 0 is strictly larger at the interim stage than ex-ante (i.e.,
as used for (9)).
At the interim s t a g ew eo b t a i nf r o mi m p l i c i td i ﬀerentiation of the requirement that
E[w(s) | θ
∗]=W (cf. condition (3))
dθ
∗
dW
= −
1
γ
1
R s
e s
∂Gθ∗(s)
∂θ∗ ds
> 0, (29)
where we have further substituted the optimal contract (cf. Proposition 2) and integrated
by parts to transform E[w(s) | θ
∗]. Comparing this with the respective expression for the
36ex-ante stage (cf. (23)), we ﬁnd that the latter is equal to (29) multiplied by
R θ
θ∗ [Gθ∗(b s) − Gθ(b s)]f(θ)dθ
R θ
θ∗ [1 − Gθ(b s)]f(θ)dθ
.
The assertion thus follows as this expression is indeed always strictly smaller than one.
The preceding argument also implies that the unique optimal commitment contract
is not renegotiation-proof. This immediately implies that the ﬁrm strictly beneﬁts from
commitment. Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 1 .It is helpful to ﬁrst recall the following observations. As by
optimality the incentive constraint (4) still binds, the ﬁrm’s objective is again to maximize
ω. In addition, for W =0we have always θ
∗ >θ FB (where we abbreviate θ
∗ = θ
∗
Board).
Note also that from the arguments in the main text it remains to prove the assertion on
the optimal on-the-job pay. We now obtain, in contrast to the case with CEO private
information, an interior cutoﬀ θ
∗ >θalso if W =0 . To prove the assertion on the
optimal on-the-job pay scheme we thus proceed somewhat diﬀerently than in the proof of
Proposition 2 (respectively, that of Proposition 1). It is convenient to ﬁrst suppose that
the on-the-job pay takes on the asserted form and to make several observations for this
case. For all θ
∗ where the respective contract is feasible (given that b s ≥ s)w eh a v ef r o m
substituting (15) into the binding constraint (4) the requirement that
Z θ
θ∗
∙
γ
Z s
e s
[Gθ∗(s) − Gθ(s)]ds +[ E[s | θ
∗] − V ]
¸
f(θ)dθ = B. (30)
As the left-hand side is strictly decreasing in b s, this pins down a unique value and thus also
a corresponding unique value W. As noted in the main text, however, the thereby deﬁned
(continuously diﬀerentiable) function W of θ
∗ may now no longer be monotonic. For what
follows, we will only need monotonicity over the range of values θ
∗ ≤ θFB (though the
respective cutoﬀ will clearly not arise in equilibrium).
Claim 1. For all feasible θ
∗ ≤ θFB and corresponding compensation contract (w,W) that
satisﬁes the characterization of Proposition 11 we have that θ
∗ represents a continuous
and strictly decreasing function of W (with corresponding adjustment of w).
37Proof. It is convenient to rewrite the binding constraint (4) and (15) as follows:
ψ1 :=
Z θ
θ∗
∙
γ
Z s
e s
[1 − Gθ(s)]ds − W
¸
f(θ)dθ − B =0 , (31)
ψ2 :=
∙
γ
Z s
e s
[1 − Gθ∗(s)]ds − W
¸
−
∙
s +
Z s
s
[1 − Gθ∗(s)]ds − V
¸
=0 ,
which has the determinant D :=
∂ψ1
∂θ∗
∂ψ2
∂e s −
∂ψ1
∂e s
∂ψ2
∂θ∗ < 0,g i v e nt h a tf o rθ
∗ ≤ θFB we have
that
∂ψ1
∂θ
∗ = −
∙
γ
Z s
e s
[1 − Gθ∗(s)]ds − W
¸
f(θ
∗) > 0,
∂ψ1
∂b s
= −γ
Z θ
θ∗
[1 − Gθ(b s)]f(θ)dθ < 0,
∂ψ2
∂θ
∗ = −γ
Z s
e s
∂Gθ∗(s)
∂θ
ds +
Z s
s
∂Gθ∗(s)
∂θ
ds < 0,
∂ψ2
∂b s
= −γ[1 − Gθ∗(b s)] < 0.
With
DW =[ 1− F(θ
∗)]
∂ψ2
∂b s
−
∂ψ1
∂b s
= γ
Z θ
θ∗
[Gθ∗(b s) − Gθ(b s)]f(θ)dθ < 0,
we have from Cramer’s rule that dθ
∗/dW = −DW/D < 0.Q . E . D .
To prove the assertion on optimal on-the-job pay, we argue again to a contradiction
and suppose that it was optimal to specify some f W ≥ 0 together with some diﬀerent
on-the-job pay scheme e w(s). The argument is now largely analogous to that in the proof
of Proposition 2 and thus kept short. Like in the proof of Proposition 2, we can then again
construct w(s) with w(s)=0for s<b s0 and w(s)=γ(s − b s0) for s ≥ b s0 satisfying the
following conditions. First, (19) must be satisﬁed, which implies that (w(s),f W) implement
t h es a m ec u t o ﬀ θ
∗ (though now this is decided by the board). Recall that in the proof of
Proposition 2 this was made more explicit by writing θ
∗(e w,f W)=θ
∗(w,f W).
Second, as e w(s) must be continuous and as (where diﬀerentiable) the slope of e w(s)
cannot exceed γ so as to be everywhere falsiﬁcation-proof, we have again a value e s ∈ (s,s)
such that ∆(s) ≥ 0 for all s<e s and ∆(s) ≤ 0 for all s>e s, where both inequalities
are strict over sets of positive measure. By the arguments from the proof of Propositions
1 and 2, where step (20) only relies on the properties of ∆(s), we know again that the
incentive constraint (4) is slack under (w(s),W). As we now increase the respective “kink”
38b s0, note that this (continuously) pushes down θ
∗.A st h i sr e l a x e s( 4 ) ,w h i l et h ei n c r e a s ei n
b s0 has the opposite eﬀect, the overall eﬀect from a marginal increase in b s0 on (4) may be
ambiguous. Still, from inspection of (4) (and using continuity) it is immediate that there
exists a highest value for b s0 where (4) is just binding. We denote the respective value by
b s and the corresponding on-the-job pay by w(s).
For a ﬁnal step in the proof of Claim 2, we now have to conduct an additional case
distinction. If the new cutoﬀ θ
∗(w,f W) <θ
∗(e w,f W) satisﬁes θ
∗(w,f W) ≥ θFB,t h e nw ea r e
clearly done: We can set w(s)=w(s) and W = W such that (w(s),W) clearly generates
higher proﬁts ω and satisﬁes the incentive constraint (4). If, instead, θ
∗(w,f W) <θ FB,
then we still have to adjust the contract. We do so by reducing W (and, respectively, w(s)
to satisfy (4)), which from Claim 1 (continuously) pushes up the cutoﬀ. (Note again that
we use here that θ
∗(w,f W) <θ FB.) As always θ
∗(w,0) >θ FB,w ek n o wt h a tt h e r ee x i s t s
(w(s),W) with W<f W and θ
∗(w,W)=θFB, which is thus again strictly more proﬁtable
than the original contract (e w,f W).43 Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 2 . Starting from the optimal (commitment) contract (w,W)
from Proposition 11 we can restrict attention to diﬀerent on-the-job pay oﬀers e w at the
renegotiation stage. If the CEO oﬀers e w, then this can clearly only be mutually beneﬁcial if
θ
∗(w,W) >θ
∗(e w,W), while from optimality for the CEO we can also restrict consideration
to θ
∗(e w,W) ≥ θFB. Note that the new oﬀer is then accepted by all “types” θ ≥ θ
∗(e w,W),
i.e., including types θ ≥ θ
∗(w,W) who would not have replaced the CEO also under the
initial contract.44 This follows from the observation that if some θ
0 < θ prefers e w over w,
i.e., if E[s− e w(s) | θ
0] ≥ E[s−w(s) | θ
0], then this holds strictly for all higher types θ>θ
0
(Claim 1 in the proof of Proposition 4). If the CEO preferred the new oﬀer, i.e., if
Z θ
θ∗(h w,W)
E[e w(s) | θ]f(θ)dθ+F(θ
∗(e w,W))W>
Z θ
θ∗(w,W)
E[w(s) | θ]f(θ)dθ+F(θ
∗(w,W))W,
then this would also have satisﬁed the incentive constrain (4). Given that the ﬁrm’s proﬁts
would be strictly higher, this contradicts optimality of (w,W). Q.E.D.
43It should be noted that in this proof we do not have to consider whether the constructed contracts
are indeed feasible (with b s ≥ s). As is immediate, this follows as the original contract e w that implemented
the ﬁxed cutoﬀ θ
∗ was assumed to be feasible.
44Likewise, if we introduced such an additional "cheap talk" stage, all θ>θ
∗(e w,W) would strictly
prefer to pretend to otherwise replace the CEO, provided that this statement leads to the oﬀer of e w.
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